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ABSTRACT
We describe a protocol in which we detect intercept-resend jamming of imaging and can reverse its effects. The
security is based on control of the polarization states of photons that are sent to interrogate an object and form an
image at a camera. The scheme presented here is a particular implementation of a general anti-jamming protocol
established by Roga and Jeffers in Ref. 5. It is applied here to imaging by photons with partially distinguishable
polarisation states. The protocol in this version is easily applicable as only single photon states are involved,
however the efficiency is traded off against the intrusion detectability because of a leak of information to the
intruder.
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1. INTRODUCTION. LACK OF PERFECT SECURITY.
Any informational advantage creates the possibility to ensure security of information transmission.1–5 Claude
Shannon formulated this rule in his seminal paper on information-theoretic secrecy in the following way ”The
enemy [...] does not know what key was chosen and the might have been keys are as important for him as the
actual one. Indeed it is only the existence of these other possibilities that gives the system any secrecy”.1 In
the same paper it was specified that perfect security of an encrypted message is achieved if the knowledge of
an encrypted message does not reduce uncertainty about which message has been encrypted. Here, we analyse
security against jamming in imaging that is achievable due to an informational advantage possessed by legitimate
imagers over an intruder who applies intercept-resend jamming.5–9 We consider a particular implementation of
a jamming detection and correct information recovery protocol established recently in.5
Before formulating this protocol as it was originaly posed let us introduce its equivalent in terms of communi-
cation scheme in the language of Shannon’s secure communication theory. Imagine a communication setup that
uses images as messages. The set of all possible messages M is commonly known to all parties, i.e. a sender, a
legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. For instance, let M consists of T and Λ-shaped images and all their
superpositions, αΛ+(1−α)T , where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Information about an image is carried by light reflected from or
transmitted through the corresponding object. On the way, at the stage of encryption, the light can be partially
intercepted and resent to the receiver in such a way that the image it carries is modified, so encrypted. The set
of intercept-resend maps K :M→M parametrised by r and β as follows
Φr,β(αΛ + (1− α)T ) = (1− r)(αΛ + (1− α)T ) + r(βΛ + (1− β)T ) (1)
forms a set of cryptographic keys. This set is also known by all parties. Knowledge of the actual key parameters
r and β allows a legitimate receiver to reverse the action of the key and get the correct message. By knowing only
the output, but not the key the eavesdropper cannot say anything about the message. All the messages from
M are equally likely. Indeed, for all outputs there exists a key that leads to all possible messages. Hence, the
situation is characterised by perfect security. However, as usual, the devil is hidden in the details of a practical
implementation.
The origine of messages consists of a light source that does not possess any information about the message
and an object. The light, after interacting with the object, creates the message. The source of light is not
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free from different kinds of noise, for instance, undefined polarisation, spectral impurity, mechanical instability,
fluctuating temperature etc. All these features are assumed to be random modulations of corresponding quantities
and are ignored during the encryption stage, which is focused only on the variables relevant to the set of
messages. However, the uncontrolled modulations do not need to be random. Some features such as fluctuations
of temperature or polarisation could be carefully designed by a producer of the lamp that collaborates with
the enemy. The anti-jamming protocol by Roga and Jeffers5 essentially indicates that such a source of light
is a Trojan Horse that provides precious information to the eavesdropper due to which all the encryption is
completely useless. The importance of really random sources in cryptography is also a subject of extensive
study, for instance in.10–14
On the other hand, if we switch the receiver and the eavesdropper and prevent the new receiver from knowing
the key that is now added by the new eavesdropper (called from now on the intruder) the Trojan Horse information
that established robustness against privacy is a source of security against unknown intercept-resend jamming,
exactly as described in.5 Again, informational advantage is a source of security.
Detection of jamming in imaging based on additional polarisation degrees of freedom has been analysed
in.6 In this scenario a variation of BB8415 was applied. The appealing feature of the polarisation degrees of
freedom is that in a single photon realisation non-orthogonal polarisations cannot be perfectly distinguished by
an eavesdropper’s measurement. This is a source of necessary errors that reveal the presence of the intruder.
The extended protocol by5 is based on comparison of static images formed for different polarisation states, where
it is assumed that the intruder cannot distinguish the states because, for instance, they have access only to local
parts of entangled states in so-called ghost imaging.16–20 In this scenario no which state knowledge leaks to the
intruder and the false part of the image introduced by him is uncorrelated to the choice of the state and can be
easily eliminated. In this paper we relax the condition of perfect ignorance of the intruder.
We analyse the probability of detection of jamming based only on the images correlated to the different states
chosen by legitimate imagers. Moreover, we modify the correct image recovery strategy taking into account that
the resent signal can be correlated with the intercepted one to some extent. The correlations cannot be perfect
as information of the intruder from a measurement of a quantum state of polarisation of single photons is smaller
than information of legitimate imagers who prepare the states.
2. JAMMING IN IMAGING BY PHOTONS WITH
PARTIALLY-DISTINGUISHABLE POLARISATION STATES
Let us consider an imaging situation shown in Fig. 1. We assume that photons carrying spatial information
about an object are also characterised by one of the polarisation states
ρ1 = |l〉〈l |, (2)
ρ2 = |↔〉〈↔|, (3)
ρ3 = |ցտ〉〈ցտ|, (4)
ρ4 = |ւր〉〈ւր|. (5)
where |ցտ〉 = (| l〉 + |↔〉)/√2 and |ւր〉 = (| l〉 − |↔〉)/√2. Photons produced by a source of light are sent to
interrogate an object, are reflected and directed to a camera. However, before reaching the camera the signal
is filtered by a polariser inclined by a fixed angle θ. On the way, a part of the signal is intercepted with rate r
by an intruder who resends photons carrying false spatial information. The intruder’s photons genuinely carry
polarisation states different than the photons sent from the legitimate source. However, states (2)-(5) are not
completely indistinguishable. Indeed, the intruder could use a measuring device that can perfectly distinguish,
for instance, ρ1 from ρ2 but which can detect no difference between the remaining states. The intruder could
resend photons with false information with two different polarisation states ρE1 and ρ
E
2 depending on results of
the measurement. In this way some correlations between the polarisations of the false photons with the correct
ones are established. As the camera is in the same place as the source the imagers know exactly when particular
states from the set (2)-(5) are chosen and can record four images related to the four states. If there is no
intrusion the figures should differ only in brightness as there is different probability that the different states pass
the polariser. In the detection and recovery strategy delivered in5 the states could not be distinguished by the
intruder, therefore the false contribution to each image was the same and it was easily filtered out just by taking
the difference between images corresponding to different states from the legitimate source. However, partial
distinguishability of states (2)-(5) allows the false contribution to depend on the state chosen by the legitimate
imagers. Simple differencing of images does not filter out this false contribution. This fact has implications for
the probability of the intrusion detection based on the images as well as forcing a modification of the correct
image recovery protocol. These items are addressed in the following sections.
Figure 1. Jamming scheme. A source S produces photons with polarisation states (2)-(5) that are chosen by a legitimate
imager. The photons are sent to interrogate an object O. Before arriving at detector D they are partially intercepted
with intercepting rate r by intruder E who resends photons with false information to the detector in order to jam the
imaging system.
Finally, let us comment on the equivalent communication problem. In this approach the states (2)-(5) would
be the Trojan Horse states of the source of light. Which state information would lead the eavesdropper to reveal
the correct message independently of the applied key that is the counterpart of the intercept-resend jamming
process. The recovery protocol would be the same for both approaches as described in Sec. 4.
3. DETECTION OF JAMMING PROBABILITY
The probability that a photon with a polarisation state ρj passes an analyser rotated by an angle θ and is
detected is given by
P (θ, ρj) = 〈a(θ)|ρj |a(θ)〉, (6)
where |a(θ)〉 = cos θ|↔〉+sin θ|l〉. By switching between ρi and ρj we change the probability in a way quantified
by the state dependent visibility5
V (ρi, ρj , θ) =
|Pi − Pj |
Pi + Pj
, (7)
where Pi and Pj are photon detection probabilities for states ρi and ρj respectively as in (6). For brevity, we
omit the arguments of Pi and Pj . We assume that Pj = Pj (θ, ρj), so that Pj is defined for a specific state and
for a chosen analyser angle. The state-dependent visibility allows us to compare quantitatively images formed
by photons with different polarization states at a given point in the imaging plane. Notice that for ρi = ρj the
visibility V (ρi, ρj , θ) vanishes, showing that the images are identical. If, instead, for two different states V 6= 0
then the intensity distributions of two images are different.
Jamming is detected if for two given legitimate states ρi and ρj the measured state dependent visibility is
different from than the expected one V (ρi, ρj , θ). In realistic experiments we need to decide whether an observed
deviation of the measured from expected visibility is an effect of jamming or of the experimental uncertainty we
tolerate. To solve this problem we estimate the probability of jamming detection based on hypotheses testing,






V (ρi, ρj , θ)− V (ρ′i, ρ′j , θ)
)
, (8)
where σ is the variance of the noise which we assume to be Gaussian. The formula can be optimised to find the
optimal pair of states and polariser angle such that the intruder detection probability is maximized. We assume
the worst case scenario in which the intruder knows the polariser position θ and the set of chosen states.
Unlike in5 where the intruder’s states were completely independent of the choice of states by the legitimate
imagers, here the intruder can resend more than one state ρEj . Which of them is to be resent depends on the
choice of the legitimate imagers to some extent. This is a consequence of the partial distinguishibility of (2)-(5).
Let us examine the possible behaviour of the intruder. They can use a polarising beam splitter oriented along an
angle φ that allows them to distinguish a state that has a component along a given axis from the states that do
not have this component. By knowing this partial information about the choice by the legitimate imagers, the
intruder can resend the photons with polarisations partially correlated to the correct states. Therefore, the false
contribution to images may depend on the choice of states, as does the correct contribution. In consequence,
V (ρ′i, ρ
′
j , θ) in (8) is non-zero and closer to V (ρi, ρj , θ). Hence, d and the probability of detection are reduced.
Let us consider an intrusion strategy and see how it affects the probability of detection. Assume that the
imager uses a polarisation state ρj to test an object. An intruder intercepts this photon with probability r,
measures its polarization using an analyser inclined by an angle φ. Depending on the effect of the measurement
the intruder chooses their state in the state ρE1 or ρ
E
2 . The imager obtains a photon in the mixed polarisation
state as follows
ρ′j = (1− r)ρj + r(〈a(φ)|ρj |a(φ)〉ρE1 + (1− 〈a(φ)|ρj |a(φ)〉)ρE2 ), (9)
where |a(φ)〉 is given as in (6).
ρ′j = (1− r)ρj + r(〈φ|ρj |φ〉ρE1 + (1− 〈φ|ρj |φ〉)ρE2 )
In the scenario with partially distinguishable legitimate states ρi, in order to minimize d, the intruder can
tune the jamming by choosing carefully the set of parameters r, φ and states ρE1 and ρ
E
2 .
Taking into account that also the legitimate imagers can choose imaging parameters to maximize the chance
of jamming detection. If the imagers do not know the strategy of the opponent then the worst case scenario
















V (ρi, ρj , θ)− V (ρ′i, ρ′j , θ)
)]}
, (10)
This complicated chain of optimisations contains the logic of the process. This formula expresses the fact that
the imagers collect images obtained from 4 states in the same imaging process and can choose after the process
which images will be compared in order to detect jamming. The choice of ρEi by the intruder does not depend
on this optimisation stage. In other words, the intruder has to decide which states to use in jamming assuming
the worst case scenario, i.e. that the legitimate imagers will maximize the detection chances. On the other hand
the legitimate imagers need to decide the angle θ of their polariser before the imaging process. To choose it
reasonably, they need to assume the worst case attack, i.e. the intruder is using best strategy.
To illustrate the detection strategy we analyse a concrete example. The polariser angle θ is such that ρ1
passes and ρ2 is blocked. Therefore, 〈a(φ)|ρ1|a(φ)〉 = 1 and 〈a(φ)|ρ2|a(φ)〉 = 0. Hence, the intruder is able to
perfectly distinguish ρ1 from ρ2 and resend photons with false information in the polarisation state ρ
E
1 = ρ1 and





and the probability of detection based on these two states is zero. The image can be jammed arbitrarily well.
On the other hand, images obtained when ρ3 and ρ4 are sent have the same contribution of the false image. In
this case V (ρ3, ρ4, θ) 6= V (ρ′3, ρ′4, θ) allowing for more efficient detection of the jamming and application of the
recovery protocol.
Without constraints on ρEi , φ and r the problem (10) is trivial as d reaches zero for instance for r = 0.
Therefore, in order to select an optimal strategy of jamming detection it is reasonable to calculate (10) assuming
a non-trivial constraint. We chose to optimize d keeping the level of jamming5 defined as follows
VL = max
j
V (ρj , ρ
′
j , θ) (11)
fixed. This quantity estimates how much an image is different from a correct one assuming that jamming occurs.
Finally, formula (10) allows us to calculate probability of jamming detection numerically. It is plotted in Fig.
2. During the minimization the intruder’s states ρE1 and ρ
E
2 are assumed to be pure, single-qubit states from
Figure 2. Jamming detection probability based on the hypotheses testing scheme with the variance of measured visibility
equal to σ = 0.1.
the one parameter family α|0〉 +√1− α2|1〉 with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We observe that for small levels of jamming the
probability of detection is not significant. In this region the intruder can take more advantage of the knowledge
about states from the legitimate source.
4. IMAGE RECOVERY BY WEIGHTED DIFFERENCE
In this section we show an example of correct image recovery if photons with partially distinguishable polarisation
states from the set ρ1 - ρ4 given in (2) - (5) respectively are chosen by the legitimate imagers. In this example we
assume that the intruder intercepts and resends photons at rate r = 1/2. The intercepted photons are measured
by an analyser that allows states ρ3 to pass. States ρ4 are blocked by the analyser, but states ρ1 and ρ2 pass
with probability 1/2. If a photon passes the analyser the intruder resends a photon carrying false information
with polarisation ρE1 = ρ3, otherwise the polarisation state ρ
E
2 = ρ2 is resent. The legitimate imagers take four
pictures using the four states. To introduce controlled distinction between the pictures an analyser directed along
the polarisation axis of ρ1 is applied. The images are formed by the states partially corrupted by the intruder
according to (9). Finally, the legitimate imager has freedom to chose which images are taken into account as
intrusion detection and image reconstruction protocol is delivered. Fig. 3 shows the situation if images related
to ρ1 and ρ2 are chosen. The upper left picture shows the image corresponding to ρ1. The probability that
the photons from the legitimate source pass the analyser is 1/2. The intensity of the correct contribution is
proportional to this value. The brightness of the false image is proportional to the probability of passing the
analyser by the false image bearing photons, i.e. 1/8 in this case. The upper right picture of Fig. 3 shows the
situation if the legitimate imager switches the state from ρ1 to ρ2. The correct contribution disappears while
the false image has brightness proportional to 1/4. As we recognise the false contribution we take a weighted
difference of the two images with a weight such that the false part disappears. In consequence, we obtain only
the correct contribution. It is shown in the lower right quarter of fig. 3. Finally, for comparison, the image
without jamming is shown in the lower right corner. This demonstrates the recovery protocol.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we apply a correct image recovery protocol for partially jammed images recently established in5
to a particular problem of imaging by photons with different, partially distinguishable states of polarisation.
Naturally, legitimate imagers who prepare the states possess more knowledge about them than can be extracted
from any measurement. Therefore, there exists an informational advantage that is a source of security against
jamming. We estimate the probability of jamming detection based only on intensities of images corresponding
to different states as a function of jamming level. This probability is evidently lower for small amounts of
jamming than the counterpart for indistinguishable states analysed in.5 The reason is that, having some partial
information about which states have been chosen by imagers, the intruder imitates the correct signal. In this
case for small levels of invasions it is easy to misconstrue the intrusion as experimental inaccuracy. However, as
Figure 3. The upper left image shows the mixture of the correct (Λ-shape) and the false (T -shape) image obtained using
states (2) and (3) respectively. The upper right image shows the false image. In this case, the correct part disappears
because the legitimate states (3) are blocked by a polariser. The lower left image shows the recovered image. For
comparison, the lower right image shows the image without jamming.
the knowledge of the intruder is not complete, errors in the imitation of correct states must appear. Therefore, a
false contribution to images is created by photons with polarisation states uncorrelated with the actual choices
of states carrying correct information. This part can be recognised and a modified version of recovery protocol
by5 can by successfully applied.
We have also shown that intercept-resend jamming in imaging is related to a communication scheme in which
messages are represented by images. These scheme can be characterised by perfect security in the sense of,1 but
can possess a Trojan Horse element in the source of light carrying the image. Our protocol implies that if an
eavesdropper knows a pattern of some light modulations that look like random noise then any intercept-resend
type encryption can be broken if r > 0.
In consequence, a perfect cryptographic key
can be created only if the resent light perfectly imitate all the modulations of the signal carrying an un-
encrypted message, even though the modulations look like random noise. Alternatively, the source should be
certified as experienced only perfectly random modulations that is also a nontrivial problem.10–14,21
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